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Abstract 
The shift in the balance of health care, bringing services ‘closer to home’, is a well established trend, 
which has been motivated by the desire to improve the provision of services. However, these efforts 
may be undermined by the improvements in access stimulating demand. Existing analyses of this 
trend have been limited to isolated parts of the system with calls to control demand with stricter 
clinical guidelines or to meet demand with capacity increases. By failing to appreciate the underlying 
feedback mechanisms, these interventions may only have a limited effect. We demonstrate the 
contribution offered by system dynamics modelling by presenting a study of two cases of the shift in 
cardiac catheterisation services in the U.K. We hypothesise the effects of the shifts in services and 
produce model output that is not inconsistent with real world data. Our model encompasses several 
mechanisms by which demand is stimulated. We use the model to  clarify the roles for stricter clinical 
guidelines and capacity increases, and to demonstrate the potential benefits of changing the goals that 
drive activity. 
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Introduction 
The balance of health care is shifting towards the primary level, bringing services ‘closer to home’1,2. 
This trend has been motivated by the broad desire to improve the provision of services. More 
specifically, there is the wish to expand services. By relocating services and reallocating 
responsibilities, service shifts enable traditional capacity restrictions to be overcome. There is also the 
desire to improve the quality of services. For example, the associated capacity increases can provide 
reduced waiting times. Service shifts can also lead to less fragmented care by consolidating services 
within fewer service levels and sometimes even within a single service centre.  
However, the efforts to improve services overall may be undermined by the unintended 
consequences of service shifts, in particular, demand being stimulated by the improvements in access 
to services. By access influencing demand as well as the reverse, a feedback structure (or closed 
causal relationship) is formed. This general feedback phenomenon has been frequently reported in the 
health care literature (e.g.3-8). Demand increases are particularly problematic in the U.K. health care 
system, the National Health Service (NHS), where there are persistent concerns about excessive 
waiting lists and waiting times, and rising costs. Further complexity arises with the varying views 
about the value of stimulated demand8-10. 
The evidence of shifts in services influencing demand has tended to be anecdotal or 
unsubstantiated assertions with existing analyses limited to isolated parts of the system, based upon 
economic appraisals and surveys. Insufficient attention has been given to the underlying feedback 
mechanisms. There have also been suggestions, but little formal analysis, of further ways in which 
demand may be stimulated. For example, Hamblin et al11 describe how when staff gain new skills, as 
a result of taking on new duties, they identify more patients in need of treatment. It is not clear how 
the various feedback mechanisms work. Furthermore, existing analyses have led to calls to control 
demand by introducing stricter clinical guidelines or to meet demand with capacity increases12-14. 
However, these interventions may only have a limited impact due to the complexity of the underlying 
feedback mechanisms. By understanding these better, it may be possible to design more effective 
policy interventions.  
 Exploring the effects of policy changes and experimenting with alternative policy formulations is 
not feasible in the real world. However, simulation models can provide a flexible experimental      
environment for this purpose. The system dynamics method15 is specifically designed for the analysis 
of feedback mechanisms. This emphasis on feedback produces quite a different simulation approach 
compared with the more common discrete event simulation16 (See Jun et al17 for examples of the 
latter). For example, in system dynamics, in order to discern the feedback mechanisms, it is necessary 
to have an appropriate conceptual distance (i.e. to ‘stand back’ from the detail). Therefore, system 
dynamics models tend to be more holistic, with aggregate flows rather than focusing on the 
complexities of flows of individuals as in discrete event simulation. Furthermore, the aim of system 
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dynamics is to provide an understanding of the modes of behaviour (the basic trends). The aims of 
discrete event simulation are more quantitative with their models repeatedly re-run to provide 
predictions.  In this paper, we describe a system dynamics modelling study18 of two cases of a specific 
shift across the patient referral chain in the NHS.  
 The patient referral chain runs from the primary level (care by general practitioners or GPs) to 
the secondary level (district general hospitals) and from there on to the tertiary level (more specialised 
hospital-based care carried out at specialist centres). Our study considered the shift in cardiac 
catheterisation (CC) services from the tertiary level to the secondary level for low risk investigations. 
A CC investigation is an invasive procedure used to diagnose heart disease. The majority of elective 
(non-emergency) investigations are low risk. Whilst a few patients who present at hospital as 
emergencies will subsequently stabilise and become elective referrals for a CC investigation, elective 
referrals typically arise from patients first seen at a hospital outpatient appointment. A CC 
investigation is not carried out as part of the outpatient appointment but at a later date, the delay being 
determined by the urgency of the investigation and the patient’s health authority’s funding constraints. 
We considered the development of CC services at two English district general hospitals. For reasons 
of confidentiality, they are referred to as ‘Veinbridge Hospital’ and ‘Ribsley Hospital’.  
The model conceptualisation process involved collecting archival data, observational work, 
informal discussions with junior hospital staff, and formal interviews with senior health professionals 
including consultant cardiologists, hospital managers and health service purchasers. The purchasers 
were senior staff who worked at the Ribsley and Veinbridge health authorities and were thus 
responsible for commissioning health services for the populations in these respective districts. The 
model’s target audience was primarily strategic decision makers involved in development of CC 
services at Ribsley and Veinbridge, and thus was tailored to address the concerns of these senior 
health professionals. 
In the remaining sections of this paper, we first briefly outline the two case histories of district 
CC services, before presenting an overview of the system dynamics model and the model-based 
experiments. Taking each case in turn, we then describe the insights obtained by the model-based 
analysis into the effects of the shifts in CC services (a base case analysis) and into how improvements 
could have been achieved (a policy analysis). Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our 
findings and highlight several areas for future research.  
 
Two contrasting case histories of district CC services  
Prior to the introduction of district services, cardiologists from Ribsley and Veinbridge Hospitals 
developed and maintained their CC skills by using tertiary facilities. They both worked at the same 
tertiary centre. The level of both Ribsley and Veinbridge’s CC activity was determined by the 
contracts between the individual tertiary centres and the Ribsley and Veinbridge purchasing 
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authorities. The elective demand for Veinbridge’s patients was met. However, there was a persistent 
problem of under-capacity for Ribsley’s patients. Consequently, temporary capacity increases had 
been provided at the tertiary level.   
District CC services were originally introduced, using a mobile catheter laboratory, to 
compensate for the temporary closure of one of the tertiary-based catheter laboratories for repairs. 
Geographical considerations dictated that separate mobile laboratory sessions were required at 
Ribsley and Veinbridge Hospitals. At Ribsley, the district service sustained the capacity increases and 
thus produced dramatic improvements in access to elective services (Figure 1a). However, this trend 
was reversed when the tertiary laboratory reopened and the district service was withdrawn. A further 
temporary service was offered at a later date to compensate for a second period of construction work 
at the tertiary centre and to provide additional capacity. This achieved further temporary 
improvements in access. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
At Veinbridge Hospital, the district CC service formed part of a long-term strategy to expand 
capacity and to develop cardiac services at Veinbridge. Consequently, after the tertiary laboratory re-
opened, the district CC service continued and was developed into a permanent service, with an 
integrated catheter laboratory. 
The collaborators provided rich descriptions of the consequences of the shift in CC services. 
They described several different mechanisms by which the improvements in access stimulated 
demand. These mechanisms involved the influences of a number of factors, in particular, the average 
waiting time, knowledge of patients and GPs of CC and the new CC service, and expanding on the 
previous reports11, the skills of the CC operators. We considered the rate of the gain in skills and the 
loss in skills associated with staff turnover. We refer to these effects as the waiting time, knowledge 
and skills effects on demand. The stimulation of demand was also reflected in the hospital data. No 
other changes occurred during the 40-month observation period that could have accounted for the 
changes in demand.               
In both cases, there was sufficient supply to meet the CC investigation waiting time goals whilst 
the district CC services were in place. However, in the Veinbridge case, the increase in demand for an 
outpatient appointment (see Figure 1b) produced severe detrimental effects on access to this service. 
This loss in access had not been anticipated. 
 
The simulation model and experiments 
We provide an overview of the model and the experiments. We focus on the key model formulations 
because the model is too large to present in detail. The complete model documentation is available 
from the authors.   
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Model structure  
The simulation model was constructed using the STELLA software19. The model contains nearly 300 
variables including 18 stocks (or levels) in the main structure and 52 overall. Stocks and their 
associated flows (or rates) are employed to: represent the physical flows in the system; calculate 
performance measures; and, compute the average values of several attributes following Homer’s 
formulation20. To avoid cluttering the model with unnecessary detail, a well known modelling pitfall, 
we focused on changes to the processes of care rather than changes in location (Figure 2).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE 
The model is divided into five main functionally related sectors or modules (Figure 3). It 
incorporates the collaborators’ composite mental map of the mechanisms underlying changes in 
demand. The endogenous variables include several referral multipliers, the waiting list lengths, 
average waiting times and patient activity rates (numbers of patients diagnosed or treated). Beyond 
the model’s explanatory boundary are a number of exogenous factors including the service capacities. 
This arose from the model purpose, which was to examine the consequences of the shifts in services 
and associated feedback effects and not the policy decisions to introduce a district service. Other 
exogenous variables reflected simplifying model assumptions. These included the base demand for an 
outpatient appointment that aggregated demand for new and follow-up appointments, and certain 
referral multipliers.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE 
The modelling perspective of system dynamics is on continuous, aggregate phenomena. 
However, there have been calls to modify the system dynamics paradigm by incorporating discrete 
and stochastic elements into its models and by disaggregating further. This has been to extend the 
range of feedback phenomena that may be studied and to satisfy clients’ desire for further detail21-23. 
In our study, it was necessary to make some modifications, for the former reason, as the emphasis was 
on decisions and processes at the local (individual hospital) level rather than the national level. This 
resulted in the introduction of discrete elements into the model including appropriate built-in 
STELLA functions. For example, to model the arrival and departure of trainee CC operators, a 
function was used which generated a pulse input of a specified size at a specified time. We also used a 
built-in logical function to specify the affordability limits for various costs including the district 
service running costs, district service preparation costs, procedural costs and overall costs. These 
limits represent the maximum amounts that could be afforded.  
 
Calculation of the elective CC investigation referral rate  
The elective CC investigation referral rate is the rate of referrals from the inpatient route (from 
patients who were admitted into hospital and subsequently stabilised) added to the rate of referrals 
arising from patients seen in outpatient clinics. The former was assumed to be constant and the latter 
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is a fraction of the outpatient activity rate. This referral fraction is a reference referral fraction 
(described later) adjusted multiplicatively by several referral multipliers.  
The model contains five base case referral multipliers. The first three are endogenous variables 
(Figure 4). The first multiplier involves the influence of the average waiting time (Figure 4a). This 
reflects how low waiting times could stimulate demand and how high waiting times could suppress 
demand. For the Veinbridge case, the waiting time was not considered a factor in referral decisions, 
which was consistent with the more ‘aggressive’ (confident and enthusiastic) referral behaviour at 
Veinbridge. This multiplier is set to a default value of 1 (zero effect).  
The second multiplier concerns the influence of the knowledge of patients and GPs of the 
benefits of CC and the new CC service (Figure 4b). By developing a local CC service, GPs and 
patients became more knowledgeable about the benefits of CC and overcame anxiety about the risks, 
and thus more demanding for this service. The extent of this effect on demand increased as the district 
service grew generating more publicity and, through ‘word of mouth’, more reports of patients who 
had benefited. This effect was delayed as GPs and patients perceived changes in the availability of 
district services. Subsequently, this multiplier is modelled as a function of the perceived district CC 
rate. The effect was greater at Veinbridge because the CC service was permanent and heavily 
marketed.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE 
The third multiplier depicts how changes in the skill base of those who select patients for a CC 
investigation could alter demand (Figure 4c). The effect of skills on demand is a weighted average of 
the skills multipliers of three categories of staff: expert CC operators; junior trainee CC operators; 
and, non-CC operators. Experts and non-CC operators were assumed to make referrals at constant 
rates with the former referring more than the latter due to their higher enthusiasm for CC and their 
greater skills in identifying patients in need (non CC operators will often be general physicians rather 
than cardiologists). The referral multiplier represents the changes in referrals of junior trainee CC 
operators as they climbed up the learning curve gaining specialist knowledge and confidence. The two 
functions reflect the different referral patterns, one representing Ribsley, involving a period of under-
confidence and the other, representing Veinbridge, also involving a period of over-confidence. The 
multiplier reflects the greater confidence ‘spilling over’ during the learning process. Periodic skills 
effects were introduced by the existence of training programmes and the rotation of junior staff 
between hospitals. 
The model contains two other referral multipliers that are, for simplicity, modelled exogenously. 
The first is the effect of significant capacity losses on referrals. It was assumed that a significant loss 
of capacity in the Ribsley case (e.g. the withdrawal of the district service) resulted in a reduction in 
referrals of the lowest priority, lowest risk cases as a ‘knee jerk’ reaction. For the Veinbridge case, as 
there were no significant capacity losses, this multiplier is set to a default value of 1 (a zero effect). 
The second multiplier is the effect of other factors on referrals. For the Veinbridge case, it reflects 
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how introducing a permanent CC service and opening the integrated laboratory prompted shifts of 
higher risk cases to the district level. For the case of Ribsley, this multiplier is set to the default value 
of 1, as the district service was only temporary.  
The reference referral fraction represents periods where: there was no district service; normal 
capacity levels existed at the tertiary level; all district screeners were fully skilled; and, there was 
neither stimulation nor suppression of demand due to the waiting time or knowledge effects. This 
would correspond with a situation for which GPs’ and patients’ knowledge of CC relied totally on that 
derived from a tertiary-based service. An expert estimate applies to the case of Ribsley and for the 
case of Veinbridge, this figure is subjected to a multiplier to account for the more ‘aggressive’ referral 
environment. The formulation chosen for the referral fraction reflects the assumption that the ‘knee 
jerk’ reaction to the capacity losses dominated over the effects of waiting times, knowledge and other 
factors on referrals for an elective CC investigation. This avoids double counting patient referrals 24. 
 
Basic mechanisms 
The basic feedback mechanisms may be summarised with the simplified causal loop diagram shown 
in Figure 5. This depicts three balancing (or controlling) feedback processes and three reinforcing 
feedback processes. Note that further balancing loops, not shown, also represent the process of 
activity adjustment.  
INSERT FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE  
        In the Veinbridge case, loop B3 was inactive due to the absence of the waiting time effect on 
demand. Loop R1 was also inactive because the expert CC operator made all final decisions about 
referrals and thus correcting any tendency to under- or over-refer. By contrast, the expert operator at 
Ribsley delegated more responsibility to the junior operators, and this included making all the final 
decisions about the patients they saw. The fact that the Veinbridge expert performed CC 
investigations and CC treatments might explain his decision to hold a tight leash over referral 
decisions. 
 
Model parameterisation 
The justification underlying the model parameters varied as efforts were made to utilise all the 
available data, as recommended by Homer25. The approximations and assumptions made served for 
the purpose of the model. A number of parameters arose from archival data provided by the 
collaborative centres including various affordability limits, CC capacities and the average procedural 
costs. Other parameters were based upon estimates given by the study collaborators. They included 
the various response times, district facility preparation times and the nonlinear functions for the 
waiting time, knowledge and skills effects on demand. There was insufficient numerical data to 
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estimate these functions econometrically, as described by Sterman26. Having been given information 
about the basic shape and extremities, we drew smooth lines to construct the functions.  
In several cases where numerical data did not exist, parameter values were derived from simple 
calculations from the actual activity rates and by assuming that parts of the system were in 
equilibrium and the desired waiting time goals were maintained. This referred to the reference 
outpatient rate and initial outpatient waiting list length for the Ribsley case.  
The calibration of several Veinbridge parameters resulted from the descriptions of equilibrium 
and the assumption (made because the expert estimate proved to be unreliable) that the cardiologists 
there referred 50% more patients than those at Ribsley. This produced a calculated outpatient rate of 
similar magnitude to that of the Ribsley case. The outpatient rate could not be verified but served for 
our purposes. These parameters included the initial outpatient waiting list length and outpatient 
capacity level.  
Some parameter values were derived from preliminary simulation runs. For example, the model 
was run for an initialisation period to set the average time spent on the waiting lists to the values 
observed in the real system. Further examples involved the use of sensitivity analysis and partial 
model testing. The former was used to derive the appropriate magnitude of the effect of other factors 
on demand to produce the reported capacity utilization rates for the Veinbridge case. The latter 
involved the magnitude of the effect of significant capacity losses on demand for the Ribsley case.  
 
Model testing procedures 
Confidence was gained in the model by applying a series of recommended and accepted tests for 
system dynamics models24,27. One key test considered the ability of the model to replicate the patterns 
of historical behaviour. In constructing the graphs of historical behaviour, known in system dynamics 
as reference modes, real data was only available for the CC variables in the Ribsley case. The other 
reference modes were constructed using hypothetical data based upon information provided by the 
collaborators. There was a good qualitative fit in both cases which was consistent with the aim of 
system dynamics modelling on reproducing the modes of behaviour (the basic trend) and avoiding the 
pursuit of point predictions15,28. Figure 6 compares the simulated and actual data for the Ribsley CC 
variables and Table 1 provides a number of historical fit summary measures, as described by 
Sterman29. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 NEAR HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Note that whilst the R2 statistic is low for the referral rate (Figure 6c), it is significantly different 
from zero. The bias (overestimates) in the average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list 
(Figure 6a) is due to two factors. Firstly, the early underestimates of the referral rate (Figure 6c). 
Fewer patients are considered to have just joined the waiting list and thus contribute, to the average 
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waiting time, a waiting time of zero. Consequently, higher average waiting times are estimated. 
Secondly, the underestimates of the tertiary-based CC investigation rate (Figure 6f). Estimating fewer 
waiting list removals produces higher waiting times. The bias in the CC investigation waiting list 
(Figure 6b) is due to the net effect of these two factors where the former dominates over the latter. 
The estimates of the tertiary-based CC investigation rate (Figure 6f) result from the estimates of the 
tertiary capacity. These were based upon approximations of the historical activity data and the reports 
that the system operated at full capacity. 
 
Model-based experiments  
For each case, the model was calibrated, initial conditions were set and a base case simulation was 
produced. Various experiments were carried out to generate insight into the base case scenarios. A 
series of policy experiments followed which showed how the senior health professionals could have 
effectively intervened to improve the provision of services. In particular, we investigated the 
effectiveness of capacity changes and the use of stricter referral guidelines Sensitivity analysis 
confirmed the insights generated by the various experiments. In this paper, we present the results of 
the key policy experiments.  
Efforts were made to evaluate and interpret the experiments in broad terms. To address both the 
localised and broader consequences of the shift in CC services, both the supply and demand for 
services were considered across the cardiac referral chain. The key outputs were: the cumulative 
referrals, cumulative patient activity, cumulative overall costs, and the basic trends displayed by the 
average waiting times and waiting lists. We modelled how long patients currently on the waiting list 
have been waiting so far. Although this underestimates the actual time spent waiting, it served for our 
purposes as a performance measure given our focus on: (a) the basic waiting time trend (both waiting 
times would display similar trends) and (b) comparisons between policy runs and the base case.  
Waiting times and waiting lists were both considered as each reflect different aspects of pressure 
on the system, respectively, the delay for services and the number of patients waiting. In the U.K. 
health system, the emphasis has switched between waiting lists and waiting times. In our case studies, 
the focus was on waiting times. The hospital consultants wanted to avoid excessive treatment delays 
and thus reduce patient anxiety and minimise the risk of patients deteriorating. As waiting time targets 
were specified in contracts for health services, hospital managers and purchasers were also concerned 
about reducing excessive treatment delays so that contractual obligations were met. However, those 
concerned about costs were also interested in the length of the waiting list. For example, if the waiting 
time target was met, an increase in the waiting list would indicate that increases in patient activity 
were necessary to prevent the average waiting time rising above its target.  
In interpreting the results of the experiments, the needs of the different senior health professionals 
were considered. Firstly, the need to improve health i.e. identify patients in need of treatment, provide 
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health care promptly and appropriately, direct resources towards the most urgent cases, and increase 
activity and thus meet higher activity targets. Secondly, the need to control the overall costs incurred 
i.e. whilst agreeing to the district service set up costs, ensuring that services were used appropriately. 
Thirdly, the need to improve efficiency i.e. deliver care at the lowest cost/case. We thus refer to health 
improvement, overall cost control and efficiency improvement perspectives.   
To summarise the graphical output of different simulation runs, for several variables, a simple 
‘pressure summary index’ was defined by the area between each graph and a tolerance level as 
specified by the relevant goal (Figure 7). We assumed that pressure would only be exerted if the goal 
were exceeded. Comparing areas thereby quantified the degree to which improvements had been 
made over the duration of the simulation run, accounting for short-term and longer-term effects and 
changes in expectations, which would be reflected by adjustments in the tolerance level.  
INSERT FIGURE 7 NEAR HERE 
 
Ribsley experiments 
The base case simulation 
The Ribsley base case simulation was produced over a period of 54 months. Numerical data was 
available for the first 37 months. We then extrapolated over 17 months by assuming that no further 
district services, and no increases in tertiary capacity were provided during this period and that the 
referral behaviour of the Ribsley cardiologists remained unchanged. Although no further numerical 
data was collected, contact continued with collaborators during this period and nothing occurred to 
contradict these assumptions. Given the persistent capacity shortages at Ribsley, further temporary 
improvements in capacity would have been expected to occur at some time in the future. However, 
information about their timing and extent was not available. Therefore, in generating the base case 
scenario for Ribsley, it was deemed inappropriate to extrapolate too far into the future. 
Insight into the basic causes of the base case scenario was gained via a series of partial model test 
simulations and sensitivity analyses. These experiments demonstrated that the pressure on Ribsley’s 
elective CC services was such that controlling the desired waiting time goal (see loop B1 in Figure 5) 
relied heavily on capacity changes (exogenous factors). The high pressure was maintained by the 
system being pushed harder when the district service was present (by seeking a lower waiting time 
goal), and by demand increasing. The latter occurred via several mechanisms including the waiting 
time (loop B2) and knowledge (loop R2a and R2b) effects on demand, which stimulated demand. 
Another factor was the changes in the skills base (loop R1) which led to periodic drops in demand as 
novice trainees periodically replaced experienced operators and, additionally, reductions in the degree 
to which demand was suppressed as they gained skills and confidence. The gains in skills and 
knowledge were not self-reinforcing as, again, they were driven by capacity changes. The temporary 
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increase in demand for an outpatient appointment prompted higher levels of cardiology outpatient 
activity as attempts were made to maintain the desired outpatient waiting time.  
Different processes interacted with one another thus generating further pressure on the system. 
For example, the increases in referrals for CC investigations in response to the reductions in the 
average waiting time drove the district activity to rise to control the waiting time. This generated more 
learning experiences for junior CC operators and thus reinforced the gain in CC operator skills 
(interactions between loops B1, B2 and R1). In spite of the increasing pressure, the capacity changes 
produced significant reductions in the CC waiting list and waiting times. However, these reductions 
were only temporary.  
The increase in demand for outpatient services was maintained for a short period beyond the 
withdrawal of district services in month 23 due to the inherent perception delay of GPs and patients 
(loop R2b). The outpatient waiting list and average waiting time exhibited small temporary increases. 
Eventually the referral expectations dropped and equilibrium was re-established. Also due to the 
perception delay, when the district service was reintroduced in month 34, it was in place for an 
insufficient length of time to prompt further increases in demand. 
  
Policy analysis: Seeking improvements in service provision  
The Ribsley policy experiments indicated that the extent of the under-capacity was such that demand 
management strategies alone (diminishing the strength of loops B2, R2a and R2b), even the use of the 
most stringent clinical guideline, could not have altered the undesirable rise in the CC waiting list and 
average waiting time. Frequent capacity increases were necessary (to intensify loop B1). Furthermore, 
coordinating capacity increases with efforts to manage demand would ensure that the benefits of 
increasing supply were not cancelled out by stimulated demand.  
Different approaches to capacity increases would have produced different effects (Figure 8 and 
Table 2). An obvious approach to increasing capacity would have been to provide a permanent district 
service, as this would have been expected to maintain the access targets permanently. However, from 
an overall cost control perspective, the benefits of increasing the supply would have been cancelled 
out by stimulated demand. The CC investigation waiting list would have exhibited a gradual rise thus 
indicating the need for further increases in the elective CC investigation rate in order to maintain the 
desired waiting time. Furthermore, the stimulated demand would have created a new problem, as 
outpatient capacity shortages would have arisen. This would have been unanticipated and it would 
have then called for further resources in an attempt to control access to outpatient services. From a 
health improvement perspective, the reduction in the CC waiting times and increases in activity 
associated with a permanent district service would have been attractive, but these benefits would have 
been undermined by the loss in access to outpatient services. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 NEAR HERE 
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INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
By using new referral guidelines, it might have been possible to suppress demand and generate 
considerably lower costs. However, whilst the use of new moderate guidelines would have enabled 
the access to CC services to be maintained, strict new guidelines would have been necessary to 
eliminate the outpatient capacity shortages. The feasibility of introducing strict new guidelines would 
have been doubtful even in a modest referral environment such as Ribsley. Therefore, even with 
realistic safeguards in place to control demand, a permanent district service could not have led to 
significant improvements from either an overall cost control or health improvement perspective. 
 
Limiting the use of district services 
The access problems generated by a permanent district service suggested that a more effective 
approach to increasing supply would have been to limit the use of district services. In theory, this 
could have involved either expanding the tertiary-based service, and just using the district service to 
compensate for tertiary facility closures, or offering further temporary district services. Compared to a 
permanent district service, carrying out the same capacity increases at the tertiary level would have 
generated fewer costs. This is because limiting the use of district services would have restricted the 
degree to which demand was stimulated (by limiting the knowledge effect on demand). Less demand 
would have meant fewer patients would have needed to be treated in seeking to maintain the desired 
waiting time. Therefore, this option would have been more attractive from an overall cost control 
perspective. However, in practice, expanding the supply for elective services at the tertiary level 
would have been difficult whilst meeting the demands for more urgent cases.  
Expanding the supply at the district level would have been more feasible, as the service would 
have been solely devoted to elective care. Those pursuing an overall cost control agenda would have 
favoured further temporary district services over the same overall capacity increases translated into a 
permanent expansion at the tertiary level. This would apply because the former would have generated 
lower costs due to the ‘knee jerk’ reductions in referrals in reaction to the capacity losses. Note that 
this experiment was supposed to reflect a continuation of the base case scenario in that the capacity 
increases were unexpected. If further capacity increases were expected, then it could be assumed that 
the ‘knee jerk’ reaction would not apply, as the cardiologists would increase their referral rates in 
anticipation of the next capacity increase.      
The preference from a health improvement perspective would have been less clear. The greater 
use of a district service would have provided more opportunities to devote tertiary resources to more 
complicated cases. It would also have led to the stimulation of more demand for outpatient services. 
Bringing more patients forward for assessment could have led to the identification of further high-risk 
patients and also supported higher activity targets. However, fewer referrals would have been made 
for CC services, as by introducing more capacity losses there would have been more ‘knee jerk’ 
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reductions in referrals in reaction to these losses. It could be assumed that these reductions would 
have referred to lower risk patients. However, their assessment as lower risk patients would have been 
based on incomplete information i.e. without the benefit of the CC investigation, which was the most 
accurate diagnostic tool available. It would have been possible that some high-risk cases that 
presented minor symptoms would have slipped though the net. Therefore, from a health improvement 
perspective, further temporary district services would have involved trade-offs. Nevertheless, it could 
be assumed that those pursuing this agenda would have conceded that, on balance, further temporary 
district services would have been the only practical way to achieve improvements in access. 
The attractiveness of further temporary district services would have been subject to district 
services being efficient. Based upon the limited data provided, the district service provided 
investigations at a lower cost/case compared to tertiary-based investigations. However, some patients 
needed to undergo a second CC procedure for treatment as synchronous investigation and treatment 
was only permitted at the tertiary level. Taking this factor into account, a district service would only 
have been attractive from an efficiency improvement perspective if it had avoided a high proportion of 
patients undergoing their CC investigation as an inpatient.  
 
Veinbridge experiments 
The base case simulation 
The Veinbridge base case simulation was produced over a period of 72 months (Figure 9). This 
included model projections of up to 27 months, based on the assumptions that the capacities for 
outpatient and elective CC investigation services remained constant and that there were no further 
shifts to the district level. Contact with the collaborators continued until month 53 and nothing 
occurred to contradict these assumptions.  
INSERT FIGURE 9 NEAR HERE 
The base case experiments demonstrated that prior to the introduction of district CC services to 
Veinbridge (at month 13), the system was stable and the waiting time goals were met (Figures 9a and 
9e). Furthermore, neither the outpatient service nor the elective CC service operated at full capacity. 
This indicated that there was some scope to raise activity levels if desired (see loop B1 in Figure 5). 
The drop in the tertiary-based CC investigation rate, associated with the closure of one of the tertiary 
labs, produced a shift in elective CC investigations to the district level (loop B1) and quickly pushed 
the remaining tertiary-based service to operate at full capacity (Figure9d). These processes acted to 
ensure that the desired waiting time was maintained. The adjustment in district activity was also 
prompted by demand being stimulated (Figure 9c). The consultant cardiologist took advantage of the 
district service to investigate more borderline cases (an exogenous factor). The development of the 
district services led to increased knowledge about CC among patients and GPs and this stimulated 
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demand for both outpatient and CC services (loops R2a and R2b). The increase in district activity 
reinforced the effect of knowledge on demand.  
By the time demand was stimulated by GPs and patients, the tertiary service had already been 
driven to operate at full (albeit reduced) capacity. Therefore, the process underlying the knowledge 
effect on demand for elective CC investigations (loop R2a) did not reinforce the adjustments in 
tertiary-based CC investigation rates. By contrast, more district activity generated more knowledge 
about CC which stimulated demand and thus led to calls for more activity in order to maintain the 
desired waiting time (interactions between loops B1 and R2a). Further interactions were produced as 
further demand for outpatient services was also generated and this led to calls for more outpatient 
activity to maintain the desired outpatient waiting time. The increases in outpatient activity produced 
further referrals for CC investigations and this contributed to calls for more district activity 
(interactions between loops B1 and R2b).  
As the district service was not operating at full capacity, there was scope for further increases in 
the district investigation rates (Figure 9d). This occurred when the integrated catheter laboratory 
opened at Veinbridge and the consultant cardiologist took advantage of the opportunity presented by 
the new facility to investigate more borderline cases. This prompted the district activity rate to 
increase (loop B1) in order to maintain the desired waiting time goal. 
The CC investigation waiting list increased (Figure 9b) and thus required the elective CC 
investigation rate to rise to maintain the desired waiting time. The waiting list rose due to the inherent 
delay between the activity rates adjusting (loop B1) in response to the increase in referrals (loop R2a), 
and the fact that efforts were only made to adjust activity to meet a desired waiting time and not a 
desired waiting list length. In general, seeking a desired waiting time will meet and maintain this goal 
provided there are sufficient resources available to respond to changes in the waiting list length with 
the necessary changes in the waiting list removal rate. However, maintaining the average waiting time 
at its desired level will not necessarily indicate that the waiting list goal is simultaneously met. The 
waiting list could, in fact, be elevated or rising above its desired level. Therefore, capacity increases 
could not have prevented the CC investigation waiting list rising.  
The outpatient waiting list and average waiting time (Figure 9e) exhibited steady increases due to 
capacity shortages. These variables displayed asymptotic growth due to the action of a balancing 
process that controlled other waiting list removals (loop B3). It only represented a minor feedback 
process whilst other processes were active, but as the saturation points were reached this loop became 
dominant. The action of this loop caused the outpatient waiting list removals to rise towards the level 
of the waiting list referrals.  
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Policy analysis: Seeking improvements in service provision 
The Veinbridge base case analysis indicated that whilst the long-term strategy to expand CC services 
at Veinbridge Hospital relied upon increases in demand, the strategy would be undermined unless it 
was coordinated with controls to limit the stimulated demand. Demand for outpatient services (where 
patients are screened for a CC investigation) would have to be controlled. Significant increases in the 
Veinbridge outpatient activity were not essential to support the expansion of CC services at 
Veinbridge. Demand for the CC service also arose from elsewhere (cardiologists from the 
surrounding districts also used the Veinbridge facilities). The Veinbridge purchasers were concerned 
that the increases in demand for outpatient services indicated a rise in inappropriate referrals. 
Consequently, they were unwilling to provide unlimited funding for outpatient services. 
 
Combining controls on demand with new forces driving activity 
The base case analysis also suggested that with sufficient slack in the system, the waiting time and 
waiting list goals could have been met simultaneously by changing the forces that drive activity rates - 
seeking a desired waiting list length rather than a desired waiting time. There was spare capacity for 
elective CC services and introducing controls on demand (diminishing the strength of loop R2b) 
would have produced some spare capacity for outpatient services.  
The policy analysis thus considered the use of stricter clinical guidelines in combination with 
changes to the goals that drive activity. The use of stricter guidelines was modelled by assuming that 
the maximum degree to which demand could be stimulated was cut by 50%. This was considered to 
form a reasonable adjustment. The factors limiting a further reduction were the acceptability of such 
guidelines in such an ‘aggressive’ referral environment, and for the case of CC services, the need to 
ensure sufficient demand to justify the development of a permanent district service at Veinbridge. For 
comparative purposes, a further experiment considered the use of stricter guidelines alone, and 
another experiment investigated the effects of a 10% increase in outpatient capacity. 
The experiments demonstrated that, the outpatient and CC waiting list and waiting time goals 
could have been simultaneously (and feasibly) met only by using stricter clinical guidelines in 
combination with seeking a desired waiting list length (Figure 10 and Table 3). In fact, this policy 
would have overcompensated by producing an average waiting time that was lower than required. The 
use of stricter new referral guidelines alone would have led to some improvements but fewer than 
those derived from the combined policy. Increasing outpatient capacity would have generated 
increases in the overall costs and CC costs in particular as further patients were pushed along the 
referral chain. 
INSERT FIGURE 10 NEAR HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
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Achieving significant and sustainable improvements 
Therefore, the implementation of the long-term strategy to expand CC services could have been 
improved by coordinating the shift in CC services with the use of new referral guidelines and changes 
to the forces that drive activity rates. This would have produced significant and sustainable 
improvements in behaviour that would have been attractive from both an overall cost control and a 
health improvement perspective. The effects of this policy would have been particularly attractive 
from an overall cost control perspective, as it would have led to improvements in access and 
reductions in costs. For those pursuing a health improvement perspective, there would have been 
trade-offs. They would have valued the improvements in access to outpatient services and reduction in 
the CC investigation waiting list but the reductions in referrals and activity would have been in 
conflict with the desires to meet higher activity targets and identify more high risk patients. 
As with the case of Ribsley, taking into account the need for some patients to undergo further 
CC, a mobile-based district service at Veinbridge was only more efficient than a tertiary-based service 
if it avoided a large proportion of patients being catheterised as inpatients. When the integrated 
catheter laboratory at Veinbridge opened, it provided the opportunity to improve the efficiency of the 
district service as the cost/case declined with the volume of patient activity. This eliminated any 
conflict there might have been in considering both a health improvement and an efficiency 
improvement perspective.   
 
Discussion 
Little attention has been given to the actual mechanisms of feedback effects associated with service 
shifts. This is in spite of the increasing emphasis in health care on the need for ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole 
systems’ thinking where the different parts of the system and their interactions are considered12,30,31. 
This paper has demonstrated the contribution system dynamics modelling can provide. Our study 
offers a plausible causal framework to support the hypothesis that shifting services can stimulate 
demand. Also, in offering empirical evidence for this phenomenon, we argue that such policies should 
be coordinated with other policy changes to control demand and to ensure that suitable forces drive 
patient activity.  
As with all models, this model is based upon certain simplifying assumptions. For example, in 
reality, there would be additional feedback mechanisms. Nevertheless, the model still successfully 
replicated the problematic behaviour reflected in real world data for both cases. Furthermore, the 
findings of this research are not specific to the subject, timing or location of the case studies as the 
interactions between supply and demand are widely generalisable. Therefore, a number of broad 
policy lessons and recommendations may be derived. These are as follows: 
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• Increasing capacity is not necessarily the most effective way of improving access 
It has been previously argued by Wolstenholme30 in a community care setting, that increasing capacity 
is not necessarily the most effective way of improving access. Our study provides further evidence of 
this paradox. Wolstenholme highlights the greater leverage of flow variables compared to that of 
stock variables. The Veinbridge case showed that capacity increases (a stock variable) and stricter 
referral guidelines (flow variables) would have provided similar leverage in improving behaviour in 
terms of reducing the waiting list and average waiting time, but significantly better leverage could 
have been obtained by combining stricter guidelines with changes to the goals that drive activity (both 
flow variables). This result arose from the existence of spare capacity and was not specific to the case 
of the shift in CC services. It was a general consequence of the interplay between supply and demand 
variables that determine the waiting list length and average waiting time. Although discussions of 
spare capacity may seem incongruous with reports of long NHS waiting lists and waiting times, some 
spare capacity is often released by service shifts, by their ability to provide additional capacity and/or 
by prioritising patients. By contrast, the Ribsley case demonstrated that in cases of extreme imbalance 
between supply and demand, only capacity increases could have provided the necessary leverage. 
However, demand management strategies could still have played an important role by improving the 
leverage of capacity increases.  
  
• Focusing on isolated events, short-term results and single performance measures can lead to 
ineffective policies and misleading conclusions.  
Our study challenges the persistent tendency in health care towards a narrow focus on isolated events, 
short-term results and single performance measures with calls made to shift the emphasis from the 
waiting list length on to the waiting time11.  For example, we showed that a permanent district service 
at Ribsley would have only produced similar short-term qualitative improvements in access to CC 
services, compared to an expanded tertiary-based service. In addition, the former would have slowly 
produced access problems further down the referral chain at outpatient services. Another example 
arises from the Veinbridge analysis. It showed how maintaining a waiting time goal did not 
necessarily mean that the system was free from pressure; the rise in the waiting list suggested that it 
was under pressure and that the waiting time goal was only being maintained because more money 
was being poured in to raise activity levels.    
 
• Patient pressure represents challenges to the delivery of health care which cannot be ignored in a 
realistic model 
The case studies also illustrated the influence of pressure by patients on clinical decisions and the 
problems that can arise from the inability to cope with this pressure and the poor management of 
demand. It has been argued that clinical and policy decisions should be driven by the preferences of 
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patients and the public33,34. Questions thus arise about how the shift in the balance of care can 
continue whilst providing high quality care to patients whose expectations for health care are 
traditionally high. 
 
Generalisations 
The model represents a plausible hypothesis of the effects of shifts in health services to improve 
access and it was parameterised to two cases of the shift in CC services. Variable names that referred 
specifically to the shift in CC services were used to ensure that the model had face validity, but the 
variables could be relabelled to more general terms.  
Whilst the NHS formed the context to our case studies, our research findings have implications 
for health service shifts in other countries in spite of the differences between their health systems. The 
NHS is a publicly funded system. Other types of health systems are privately funded or insurance-
based. The stimulation of demand in response to improved access is a common response in the NHS 
and it is a consequence to services being free at the point of delivery. However, it could be argued that 
services in other health systems, whether private or insurance-based, are all free to some extent in one 
sense or another. The individual feedback mechanisms that we have discussed can be generalised to 
other health systems. Even the impact of waiting times on referrals can be generalised in spite of the 
fact that waiting lists are a typical characteristic of the NHS; the waiting time can translate to other 
health systems into the price customers pay for services. The waiting time is a price in some form and 
its causal relationship with demand is the same.  
 
The ‘supplier induced demand’ debate 
Our study contributes to the ‘supplier induced demand’ (SID) debate by offering evidence of the 
existence of inducement and by providing insight into the underlying feedback mechanisms. SID 
refers to a doctor acting as an imperfect agent by providing or recommending more (or less) services 
that a fully informed and knowledgeable patient would order3,4. In our study, we considered how 
patients demanded more services as they gained knowledge and thus led to increases in the utilisation 
of CC services. This would suggest that prior to the acquisition of this knowledge, both the GPs (in 
considering referrals for an outpatient appointment) and cardiologists (in considering referrals for a 
CC investigation) were acting as imperfect agents by suppressing demand. However, we should point 
out that our model aggregates the response to increased knowledge about both the health benefits of 
CC and the ability to undergo CC locally. Providing a local district service instead of a more remote 
tertiary service could be perceived as an improvement in service quality. Changes in demand that 
relate to changes in service quality alone do not support the existence of SID as they can be explained 
within the standard theory of supply and demand35.  
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The effect of other factors on demand as presented by the Veinbridge case and the waiting time 
effect on demand could involve doctors “altering the perceptions of the patient’s needs and of the 
capacity of medical technology to satisfy them”, which is a description of SID by Evans36. However, 
the latter effect would not indicate the existence of SID if patients considered the waiting time to be a 
key factor in determining their desire for a CC investigation. 
 
Potential changes in health  
In both cases, the stimulated demand prompted increases in activity. The question of whether or not 
the increase in the CC investigation rate actually improved health was not fully addressed as serial 
data of clinical events and long-term patient outcomes were not monitored. However, several 
comments could be made. In the Ribsley case, the waiting time for catheterisation dropped and this 
contributed to shorter delays for those requiring invasive treatment (coronary angioplasty or coronary 
bypass surgery). This could offer the potential for health benefits as treatment delays can lead to some 
patients deteriorating.  
The fraction referred on for a CC investigation increased in both cases. As the case mix of the 
patient populations did not change, this meant that the threshold for a CC investigation had changed 
towards less severe cases (defined without the benefit of a CC investigation). Catheterising more of 
these patients could lead to improvements in health if it identified further patients in need of invasive 
treatment; some patients with severe heart disease only display minor symptoms and these patients 
may thus fail to be identified by other diagnostic methods. The fraction of patients referred on for 
invasive treatment remained constant so, associated with the increased catheterisation rate was an 
increased invasive treatment referral rate. This would suggest that, from the less severe cases, further 
patients in need of such treatment had, indeed, been identified. However, for even less severe cases, it 
might be better to delay bypass surgery until the disease is more advanced as repeat bypass surgery, 
which can occur given the progressive nature of heart disease, carries higher risks. Therefore, 
delaying catheterisation (and therefore delaying bypass surgery) could, paradoxically, be beneficial in 
the long-term management of the disease. 
 
Further work    
The research described in this paper could be developed in several different ways. The model could be 
employed to explore other service shifts, of which there are numerous examples. This would serve to 
verify if the research findings could be replicated, and could thus increase the evidence base that 
improving access can stimulate demand, or if the findings warranted some revision. The model 
boundary could be extended to endogenise the follow-up process of patients after their discharge from 
an outpatient appointment and the process of changes in the referral threshold for CC and district CC 
as the district service evolves. The model could also be disaggregated to elucidate the dynamics of 
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changes in clinical priority between routine and urgent elective cases. Finally, the pressure summary 
index could be investigated further to establish its scope and limitations and thus draw up 
recommendations for its use and, if necessary, its refinement. 
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Table 1 
  
   Theil’s Inequality Statistics*   
Fig. MAPE Bias Unequal Variation Unequal Covariation R2 N 
5a 0.18 0.60 0.09 0.31 0.88 35 
5b 0.13 0.68 0.01 0.31 0.93 35 
5c 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.94 0.24 35 
5d 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.87 0.80 35 
5e 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.80 0.96 35 
5f 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.91 35 
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Table 2 
 
  % Change from Base Case 
Performance 
Measure 
Base 
Case 
Permanent  
District 
Service 
Expanded  
Tertiary 
Service 
Further  
Temporary District 
Services 
PSI for outpatient waiting list 155 >+8000 -44 0 
PSI for CC waiting list 891 +1.6 -40.5 -10.6 
Cumul. referrals for an outpatient appt 19,937 +9.7 -0.2 0 
Cumul. referrals for a CC investigation 947 +13.4 +4.7 -1.4 
Cumul. outpatient activity 18,784 +3.5 -0.2 0 
Cumul. CC investigations 848 +14.9 +9.4 +4.3 
Cumul. Costs 2,439,461 +6.4 +1.7 +1 
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Table 3 
 
  % Change from Base Case 
Performance 
Measure 
Base  
Case 
Increased 
Outpatient 
Capacity 
With Stricter 
Referral 
Guidelines 
With Stricter Referral 
Guidelines & Seeking 
a Desired List Length 
PSI for outpatient waiting list 11,263 -68.4 -84.2 -98 
PSI for time spent on outpatient waiting list 17 -100 -100 -100 
PSI for CC inv. Waiting list 5,043 +2.4 -52.2 -96.6 
Cumul. referrals for an outpatient appt 30,295 0 -6.5 -6.4 
Cumul. referrals for a CC inv. 4,140 +0.9 -19.6 -19.5 
Cumul. outpatient activity 29,092 +1.5 -5 -4.7 
Cumul. CC investigations 3,922 +0.9 -18.6 -16.8 
Cumul. Costs 6,801,121 +1 -10.2 -9.3 
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Figure 1  Consequences of district services: improving access and stimulating demand. Black blocks 
indicate the use of district services 
Figure 2  The main patient flows. The direction of flow is indicated by the white arrowheads. 
Figure 3  The main sectors 
Figure 4  Base case waiting time, knowledge and skills referral multipliers * - Neither stimulates nor 
suppresses demand; † - 100 represents a fully skilled CC operator; Values above 1 - Stimulation of 
demand; Values below 1 - Suppression of demand 
Figure 5  Basic feedback structure. B1 -  Activity adjustment; B2 - Waiting time effect on demand; 
B3 - Other outpatient waiting list removals; R1 - Skills effect on demand; R2a&b - Knowledge effects 
on demand (for elective CC investigations and outpatient appointments respectively). 
Figure 6  Historical fit for the CC variables in the Ribsley case. Actual data is smoothed with a 2 
point-centred moving average. Black blocks indicate the use of district services during month 14 to 
month 23 and month 34 to month 38; Avg - Average; CC Inv - CC Investigation 
Figure 7  Using a pressure summary index to measure an improvement under test conditions. PSI - 
Pressure summary index; Pressure Proxy - Waiting list length or average waiting time  
Figure 8  Increasing elective CC capacity for Ribsley case. The outpatient waiting list graphs for runs 
0 and 3 are the same 
Figure 9  Selected variables for the Veinbridge base case scenario. Black blocks indicate the use of 
district services (introduced at month 13 and with integrated catheter laboratory opened at month 34); 
Avg - Average; CC Inv - CC Investigation; OP - Outpatient 
Figure 10  Meeting the outpatient waiting list and waiting time targets for Veinbridge case 
Table 1  Statistics of the historical fit for the CC variables in the Ribsley case. * The failure to sum to 
unity is due to rounding errors. 
Table 2  Selected summary statistics of Ribsley policy runs. Cumul. - Cumulative; PSI - Pressure 
summary index 
Table 3  Selected summary statistics of Veinbridge policy runs. CC inv. - CC investigation; Cumul. - 
Cumulative; PSI - Pressure summary index. 
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